UIC Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 18

Fall 1975

The Use of Jeopardy Assessments in Narcotics Enforcement, 9 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 262 (1975)
John H. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Anderson, The Use of Jeopardy Assessments in Narcotics Enforcement, 9 J Marshall J of Prac. &
Proc. 262 (1975)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/18
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

COMMENTS

THE USE OF JEOPARDY ASSESSMENTS
IN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT
INTRODUCTION

In 1971 President Nixon launched a new program to control
the drug traffic in the United States by coordinating the resources of Government agencies.' The Internal Revenue Service
"Narcotics Project," which operates in 90 metropolitan areas, has
assumed an especially important role in this new drug control
program. 2 Internal Revenue Service agents have been working
closely with local police departments, which notify the IRS
whenever a suspected drug dealer is arrested. The IRS quickly
prepares a large tax assessment against the alleged narcotics
dealer to secure collection of projected income tax on earnings
from the sale of drugs. In order to cover the assessment, the
assets of the suspected dealer are immediately seized.3 During
the first two and a half years of the program about $27 million
was seized and $101 million was assessed against 3,475 drug suspects. 4 Authority to make these summary seizures without any
kind of prior notice is granted to the IRS under two sections
of the Internal Revenue Code.
The IRS uses section 6861 of the Internal Revenue Code of
19545 when the circumstances indicate that a suspected narcotics
1. Special Message by President Nixon to the Congress on Drug
Abuse, Prevention and Control, June 17, 1971, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNIED STATES, RICHARD NIXON, 1971, at 740 (1972).
2. McClintick, Taxing Tactic: IRS Swiftly Grabs Drug Suspects'
Assets in Crackdown Effort, Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1974, at 1.
3. Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499
F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis v. Sandier, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974);
Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974); Hall v. United States,
493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974); Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th
Cir. 1974); Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (Nev. 1973); Lisner
v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (Ariz. 1973); Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F.
Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Williamson v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971); Graham, The Narcotics Project, THE Nzw REPUBLIC 14 (Feb. 1, 1975); McClintick, Taxing Tactic: IRS Swiftly Grabs
Drug Suspects' Assets in Crackdown Effort, Wall Street Journal, April
10, 1974, at 1.
4. Note 2 supra.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 6861(a) (1970):
If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized
by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213 (a),
immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest, addi-
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dealer has not reported his entire income from the sale of drugs
on previous returns. Section 6861 gives the IRS authority to
seize a taxpayer's assets without prior notice6 when it believes
that the collection of a deficiency 7 would be jeopardized by delay.
tional amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law), and
notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his delegate
for the payment thereof.
6. When there is an ordinary deficiency assessment, the taxpayer
has ten days after notice of the deficiency to pay the tax before the IRS
can levy on his property. Since a jeopardy assessment has the force of
a judgment, notice, demand and seizure may be made simultaneously
without regard for the ten day period.
26 U.S.C. § 6331 (a) (1970):
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the

same within ten days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for

the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax (and such further
sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expense of the levy) by levy
upon all property and rights to property.., belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax ....

If the Secretary or his delegate makes a find-

ing that the collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand
for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the Secretary
or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection

thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period
provided in this section.
State law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest

which a taxpayer has in property sought to be reached by a section
6331 (a) lien. Federal law, however, determines the priority of competing
liens against a taxpayer's interests as defined by state law once a federal
tax lien has attached. Nevertheless, even if a tax lien has attached to
a taxpayer's interest, a transfer of that attached interest by the taxpayer
to a third party who takes in good faith without notice gives that transferee a claim superior to that of the Government if there has been no
levy. Chicago Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cacciatore, 25
Ill 2d 535 545, 185 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1962). However, if the Government
has served notice of a lien and notice of a levy, the Government's claim
will be superior to that of a subsequent transferee. United States v.
Lewis, 272 F. Supp. 993, 995 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
26 U.S.C. § 6861(b) (1970):
If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice in respect of
the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed
under section 6212(a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail
a notice under such subsection within 60 days after the making of
the assessment.
A jeopardy assessment is invalid when a deficiency notice is not
mailed within 60 days. United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1964).
But the invalidity of one such assessment does not prevent the making
of additional jeopardy assessments. Berry v. Westover, 70 F. Supp. 537
(S.D. Cal. 1947); Teitelbaum v. C.I.R., 40 T.C. 206 (1963). Thus a series
of jeopardy assessments can be used to avoid the 60 day limitation and
prevent access to the Tax Court until the IRS issues a 90 day letter. See
petitioner's contentions in Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388, 389 (5th
Cir. 1954).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 6211 (a) (1970):
For purposes of this title in the case of income, estate, gift, and excise taxes ... the term 'deficiency' means the amount by which the
tax ... exceeds the excess of(1) the sum of
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his
return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an
amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon,
plus
(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over(2) the amount of rebates ....
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Collection of a deficiency is considered in jeopardy when a taxpayer contemplates leaving the country or hiding his assets, or
when the statute of limitations is about to run. Recently, however, the IRS has been using its jeopardy assessment power to
seize the assets of narcotics dealers with little indication that the
dealer is planning to place his assets beyond the reach of the
IRS. When the broad powers to declare jeopardy and make
summary seizures are used in this manner, section 6861 becomes
a particularly effective means to curtail traffic in narcotics.
By another provision of the 1954 Code, section 6851, the IRS
has authority to terminate the taxable year of a taxpayer and
demand immediate payment of the tax for the taxable period
so declared terminated.8 Section 6851 is used to make a quick
seizure of the assets of a suspected narcotics dealer because it
eliminates the need to consult his prior returns to determine the
amount of the deficiency. The termination assessment provision
has traditionally been interpreted as requiring the IRS to make
a finding that the taxpayer plans to depart quickly from the
United States, to remove or conceal his property, or generally
to do any act which could hinder collection of the tax. Nevertheless, the IRS has been using termination assessments against narcotics dealers whenever they are arrested and found with large
amounts of cash.
Unlike the procedure for jeopardy assessments, when the IRS
terminates the taxable year of a taxpayer under section 6851,
there is no statutory requirement that a deficiency notice be
mailed to a taxpayer.9 The IRS has argued that the taxpayer
therefore has no means of admission to the Tax Court and must
either pay the deficiency and sue for a refund in the district court
or wait until the end of his normal taxable year to contest the
8. 26 U.S.C. § 6851 (a) (1) (1970):
If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer designs quickly
to depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any
other act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax for the current or
preceding taxable year unless such proceedings be brought without delay, the Secretary or his delegate shall declare the tax-

able period for such taxpayer immediately terminated, and shall

cause notice of such finding and declaration to be given the taxpayer,
together with a demand for immediate payment of the tax for the
taxable period so declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding taxable year or so much of such tax as is unpaid, whether or
not the time otherwise allowed by law for filing return and paying
the tax has expired; and such taxes shall thereupon become immediately due and payable. In any proceeding in court brought to enforce payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the provisions of this section, the finding of the Secretary or his delegate,
made as herein provided, whether made after notice to the taxpayer
or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of jeopardy.

9. Id.
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termination assessment. 10 There is a growing trend on the part
of the courts, however, to reject this argument and to require
that a deficiency notice be sent to a taxpayer who has been subjected to a termination assessment, thereby providing the taxpayer with a more immediate forum of relief." Another consequence of this new trend is that if a deficiency notice is required,
and the IRS fails to mail such a notice to the taxpayer, the termination assessment or levy can be enjoined under section 6213(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code. 12 Section 6213(a) provides for
an exception to the general section 7421 (a) 13 bar against injunctions of tax assessments when a deficiency notice is required for
a particular type of assessment but no such assessment is mailed.
Of even greater importance, however, is a growing willingness on the part of courts to question the very finding of
jeopardy by the IRS. Whereas previously it was generally
thought that courts did not have authority to review the exercise of discretion by the IRS in determining the existence of
jeopardy, 14 there are some recent cases in which the finding of
jeopardy is questioned, thereby opening a new avenue for relief
to a taxpayer whose property has been seized under a jeopardy
assessment. Many of these new decisions have resulted from litigation caused by jeopardy assessments under the IRS Narcotics
Project. Before the effect of these new decisions can be evaluated, it is necessary to examine the more traditional judicial response to jeopardy assessments to show why these new decisions
10. Cases cited note 61 infra. See also 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1970):
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the re-

covery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have

been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for
refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary or his dele-

gate ....

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970):

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the Court of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of
any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have

been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under
the internal revenue laws ....
11. Cases cited note 60 infra.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (1970):

Within 90 days ... after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . ., the taxpayer may file a petition with the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.
13. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1970):

Except as provided in sections 6212 (a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a)
and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.
14. Cases cited note 55 infra.
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are so important and what possible consequences
produce.

they may

THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
JEOPABY AsSESSMENTS
Despite the apparent objection of deprivation of property
without a proper hearing, the Supreme Court in 1931 upheld the
constitutionality of jeopardy assessments in Phillips v. Commissioner.15 The Court reasoned that there was no denial of proce-

dural due process 16

because the taxpayer had an adequate

opportunity for a later judicial determination of the issue and
extent of his tax liability. The Government's need to secure
prompt collection of its revenue was held to justify the summary
administrative seizure by jeopardy assessment. 17 This approach
to the constitutional question has been dutifully followed whenever the issue is raised,' 8 and it seems highly unlikely that there
will be any sudden change in the position of the courts.
15. 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
16. The Supreme Court has recently examined the problems posed
b procedural due process. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
orida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, which permitted a secured
installment seller to repossess goods without a hearing or judicial supervision, were held unconstitutional as violating the fourteenth amendment. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court upheld the Louisiana sequestration statute which permitted a seller-creditor
with a vendor's lien to secure a writ of sequestration and cause the
sheriff to take possession of the property after bond had been filed. The
sequestration writ, however, could only be issued by a judge upon the
filing of an affidavit which clearly explained the facts which entitled the
creditor to sequestration. The debtor was also allowed an immediate
hearing after seizure. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Supreme Court held that Georgia garnishment
statutes were unconstitutional because they authorized issuance of a writ
of garnishment on an affidavit consisting of conclusory allegations without participation by a judge even though it was required that a double
bond be posted. There was no provision in the Georgia statute for an
early hearing at which the creditor would be required to demonstrate
at least probable cause for the garnishment. In fact, the debtor would
not be able to challenge the garnishment until he filed a bond.
17. Phillips v. Comm., 283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931).
18. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); Dyer v. Gallagher, 203 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1953). See also-Publishers New Press,
Inc. v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), wherein the court
rejected the taxpayer's contention that his first amendment right to freedom of press was violated by a jeopardy assessment because it was forcing him to discontinue publication of his newspaper. The court did not
enjoin the assessment. In Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir.
1957), the court similarly refused to enjoin a jeopardy assessment. The
court rejected the taxpayer's contention that his constitutional rights to
a fair trial were denied because he had no funds with which to retain
competent counsel after the jeopardy assessment. In Ianelli v. Long, 487
F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973), a lower court's injunction of a jeopardy assessment was reversed. The taxpayer showed that a refund suit would expose him to criminal liability because he would have to file a return
showing illegal sources of income. Plaintiff had contended that this was
a violation of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. See
also Yannicelli v. Nash, 354 F. Supp. 143 (D.N.J. 1972).
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Although a challenge to the constitutionality of a jeopardy
assessment will probably be unavailing, the taxpayer whose
assets have been seized may stay the collection by filing a bond
with the Commissioner under section 6863.19 This remedy, however, is usually of little value because the assets of a taxpayer
are seized when he learns of the assessment.20 It will therefore
be very difficult for the taxpayer to raise a bond which must
equal the amount of the assessment. 21 Commercial bonding companies will be reluctant to furnish a bond to a taxpayer unless
he has assets far in excess of the amount assessed. 22 The statutory provision for a stay of the assessment until the Tax Court
decision becomes final, therefore, seems to be a remedy available
only to those taxpayers who are still in possession of a substantial portion of their assets after the jeopardy assessment. There
2
are few taxpayers in this position after such an assessment.
Since in many instances the harsh consequences of a jeopardy assessment readily appear unjust, a natural remedy would
be intervention by equity to enjoin collection of the jeopardy
assessment. Although section 7421 expressly prohibits suits to
restrain assessment or collection of any tax, 24 many taxpayers
persist in their attempts to obtain an injunction. The current
statutory prohibition against injunctions was originally enacted
in 186726 and was strictly construed until 1932, when the Su19. 26 U.S.C. § 6863(a) (1970):

When a jeopardy assessment has been made under section 6861 or
6862, the collection of the whole or any amount of such assessment
may be stayed by filing with the Secretary or his delegate, within
such time as may be fixed by regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate, a bond in an amount equal to the amount as to which
the stay is desired, conditioned upon the payment of the amount (to-

gether with interest thereon) the collection of which is stayed, at the
time at which, but for the making of the jeopardy assessment, such
amount would be due. Upon the filing of the bond the collection

of so much of the amount assessed as is covered by the bond shall

be stayed.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (a) (1970) cited in note 6 supra.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 6863(a) (1970) cited in note 19 supra.

22. Gould, Jeopardy Assessments: When They May Be Levied and
What To Do About Them, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 937, 944-45

(1960).
23. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-

nied 396 U.S. 986 (1969) (jeopardy assessment of $282,000); Homan Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Long, 264 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 839
(1959) (jeopardy assessment of $3,000,000 where IRS admitted maximum
tax liability of $300,000); Melvin Building Corp. v. Long, 262 F.2d 920

(7th Cir. 1950) ($550,000 jeopardy assessment where maximum tax due
was $58,000); Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 762 (S.D. Fla.
1957) ("every bit" of taxpayer's property seized).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a) (1970) cited in note 13 supra.

25. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 475: "And no suit for the

purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court." This statute later became REv. STAT. § 3224 (1875),
and was codified in § 604 of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat.
873. Although the language has been changed slightly, the present section 7421 was preceded by INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 36, § 3653(a), 53

Stat. 446.
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preme Court created a narrow judicial exception to the statute
26

in the case of Miller v. StandardNut Margarine Co.

In Standard Nut, the Court reexamined the history and purpose of the prohibition against injunctions, and decided that the
statutory bar embodied traditional equity principles. Because
the statute did not specifically refer to cases involving exceptional circumstances, the Court decided that the general wording
of the statute did not foreclose equitable relief. The holding in
Standard Nut allows courts to prohibit the enforcement of j eopardy assessments if the complainant can show both the illegality
27
of the assessment and circumstances justifying equitable relief.
In handling suits for injunctions of jeopardy assessments, the
courts that followed Standard Nut generally emphasized the requirement of showing sufficient grounds for the intervention of
equity. The general view was that an injunction would be issued
if the taxpayer could show that he would suffer irreparable harm

if the assessment was not enjoined. 28

This approach is consistent

with the position taken by the Supreme Court in Standard Nut,
where it was found that the taxpayer's business would be
destroyed if the jeopardy assessment was not enjoined. 29 Under
the judicial interpretation of Standard Nut, it was relatively easy
to obtain an injunction until 1962. In that year the Supreme
Court restored importance to the requirement that the taxpayer
must show that a jeopardy assessment is illegal before it will
26. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
27. Id. at 509. In Standard Nut the IRS was enjoined from collecting
a jeopardy asssessment. The IRS had contended that a margarine excise
tax applied to the complainant which produced a product similar to margarine but which was manufactured only from vegetable oils. The Court
issued the injunction after finding that the enforcement of the jeopardy
assessment would destroy the taxpayer's business and that there was no
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 510-11.
28. Smith v. Flynn, 261 F.2d 781, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1958) (forced sale
of taxpayer's crops seized under a jeopardy assessment enjoined after
finding that taxpayer would suffer loss if his crops were sold prior to
a determination of his actual liability because of rising farm prices);
Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1953) (injunctive relief
granted after finding that taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm if the
assessment were not enjoined because the IRS was preparing to conduct
a forced sale of taxpayer's business properties seized under the assessment); Yoke v. Mazzello, 202 F.2d 508, 509-11 (4th Cir. 1953) (injunction
issued against an arbitrary refusal by the IRS to accept the taxpayer's
secured bond after taxpayer showed that he would lose his home, business and life savings if the assessment were not enjoined); Kaus v. Huston, 120 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1941) (taxpayer's contention that he
would suffer financial hardship if assessment was not enjoined found not
to be special and extraordinary circumstances which would require the
issuance of an injunction); Macejko v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 87, 88
(N.D. Ohio, 1959) (injunction issued after finding that threat of business
ruin to the taxpayer was an exceptional circumstance); Rosenthal v. Allen, 75 F. Supp. 879, 883 (M.D. Ga. 1948) (injunction issued against
forced sale of rental property seized under assessment because it was
taxpayer's only source of income).
29. See note 27 supra.
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be enjoined. This aspect of the rule laid down in Standard Nut
had with few exceptions been overlooked for thirty years.
In Enochs v. Williams Packing Co. the Supreme Court held
that suits to enjoin collection of an assessment "may not be entertained merely because collection would cause an irreparable injury."3 0 The Enochs court ruled that an injunction would be
issued only if it was apparent that the Government could not
establish its claim "under the most liberal view of the law and
the facts. '3 1 The Enochs rule is very restrictive and in effect
deprives the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer of all equitable relief
unless he is able to prove the substantive invalidity of the
Government's claim. 32

The Court also directed its attention to

the problem of procedural invalidity with regard to a jeopardy
30. 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).

The Enochs Court denied an injunction.

Validity of the tax rested on the employer-employee relationship between owners of shrimp boats and their crews. Since the Government's
claim had some foundation because the fishermen were corporate employees, the taxpayers failed to meet their burden of showing that the
Government could not prevail under any circumstances. After Standard
Nut, courts generally overlooked the requirement that an assessment had
to be illegal before collection would be enjoined. In reasserting this aspect of the rule originally set forth in Standard Nut, the Enochs Court
noted that Congress had enacted the Tax Injunction Act five years after
the Standard Nut decision. This act prohibited federal suits to enjoin
collection of state taxes where state courts provide adequate remedy.
The Enochs Court reasoned that since similar language was not included
in section 7421, Congress must not have intended to allow injunctions
against collection of federal taxes in situations normally calling for the
intervention of equity. It is for this reason that the "irreparable harm"
test was replaced by the more rigorous prerequisite that the taxpayer
had to show that collection of the tax was illegal before an injunction
would issue.
31. 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
32. Westgate-California Corp. v. United States, 496 F.2d 839, 843 (9th
Cir. 1974) (although Westgate was able to show irreparable injury because it would be forced into bankruptcy by the assessment, the complainant failed to show that the Government could not establish its
claim); Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1974) (no injunction issued because taxpayer failed to meet Enochs test); Mersel v.
United States, 420 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1969) (refund suit in which the court
held that Government's position that taxpayers engaged in wagering was
not clearly erroneous and therefore denied relief); Transport Manufacturing & Equipment Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1967) (action for injunction dismissed because taxpayer, who contended that the
IRS should be compelled to revoke its finding of jeopardy, failed to show
the illegality of the assessment); White v. Cardoza, 368 F. Supp. 1397
(E.D. Mich. 1973) (court denied Government's motion to dismiss suit for
injunction to allow taxpayer an opportunity to attack Government's finding of jeopardy on two grounds: first, that the discretionary finding of
jeopardy was arbitrary and without foundation because the assessment
was computed from inadequate records and the Government had no reason to believe that plaintiff was subject to the wagering excise tax, and
second, that there was a procedural defect in that neither the Secretary
nor his delegate made the required finding of jeopardy prior to the assessment); Parenti v. Whinston, 347 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (no injunction issued because taxpayer failed to show that the Government
was acting in bad faith and had no chance of establishing the validity
of its claim); Liguori v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 530, 531-32 (E.D.N.Y.
1965) (motion. for injunction against jeopardy assessment denied with
discussion of Enochs rule).
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assessment. The Court noted that the major purpose of section
7421 was to permit the assessment and collection of taxes without
judicial intervention. Only in this manner would the United
States be assured of prompt collection of its lawful revenue. In
questioning the legality of an assessment, no more than good
faith would be required on the part of the Government. Therefore, "the Act [section 7421] prohibits suits for injunctions
barring the collection of federal taxes when the collecting officers
have made the assessment and claim that it is valid. '88 Under
Enochs, injunctions are not available to contest the director's discretionary finding of jeopardy. It is against the background of
this decision that a number of recent cases exemplify a new trend
in approaching suits to enjoin jeopardy assessments.
QUESTIONING THE FINDING OF JEOPARDY AND THE
COMPUTATION OF THE ASSESSMENT

The distinguishing characteristic of some new decisions is
that courts are willing to enjoin termination and jeopardy
assessments for procedural invalidity of the Government's claim.
If the finding of jeopardy has been improperly made or if the
amount of the assessment has been improperly computed, some
courts have enjoined the jeopardy seizure despite the statutory
bar of section 7421 against injunctions of tax assessments. 4 Four
circuits have taken the position that a jeopardy assessment
should be enjoined when the discretionary power to make a finding of jeopardy and summarily seize a taxpayer's property is
abused. 85
This new approach to jeopardy assessments originated in the
Second Circuit case of Pizzarello v. United States,3 6 which was
decided just two years before the IRS Narcotics Project began
operations. In Pizzarello, the IRS based its jeopardy assessment
87
upon records seized during the search of defendant's premises.
This search was held illegal and the court decided that the
illegally seized evidence could not be used by the IRS in making
its finding of jeopardy. Furthermore, the court also held that
the District Director made a totally excessive computation of the
assessment based on entirely inadequate information.8 8 The IRS
33. Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1, 8 (1962).

34. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a) (1970) cited in note 13 supra.

35. In addition to the Second, Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, the
Seventh Circuit has also disclosed a tendency to break from its position
that the discretionary power of the IRS in finding a jeopardy situation
is not subject to judicial review. In Durovic v. C.I.R., 487 F.2d 36, 4041 (7th Cir. 1973), the court stated that a continuing jeopardy assessment
was "presently unfair and unreasonable."
36. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).

37. Id. at 584.
38. Id. at 585-86.
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agents had used the average of wagers accepted by Pizzarello
over a three day period to compute the amount of wagers which
he allegedly made over a five year period. The IRS, however,
could not prove that Pizzarello operated as a gambler for those
five years or, even if he did so operate, that his average wagers for
the three day period were representative of his daily business
for the other 1,575 days.3 Because the determination of a jeopardy situation was based on illegally seized evidence and since
the assessment was "excessive, arbitrary, and without factual
foundation," the Second Circuit enjoined the jeopardy assessment
against Pizzarello.40 The importance of this case is that the basis
for the injunction was an abuse of discretion by the Government.
In Willits v. Richardson,41 which is typical of how the IRS
uses a termination assessment against suspected narcotics dealers,
the Fifth Circuit reversed a dismissal of the taxpayer's suit for
an injunction. In Willits, the plaintiff had brought suit to enjoin
a jeopardy seizure of virtually all of her property. The assessment was made when the IRS was notified by the Miami Police
Department that the plaintiff had been arrested for speeding and
that she was riding with a suspected narcotics dealer at the time
of her arrest. A search of the plaintiff's purse had revealed some
barbiturate tablets and $4,400 in cash. The jeopardy assessment
against the plaintiff was computed from some notations on the
back of a scrap of paper which had also been found in the plaintiff's purse.42 The notations read as follows:
Ceon - 3000

Ron

1500

Slt -

2000

500
P
C
400
5900.48
ME
The IRS agent presumed that this list showed the distribution
of income from a typical drug sale. The agent also assumed that
"ME" referred to the plaintiff and that therefore her commission would amount to 44 percent of the proceeds from a sale
of drugs. Furthermore, the agent assumed that the plaintiff was
involved in the illicit importation of six kilos of cocaine which
was sold at $40,000 per kilo. 4

The court found that there were

no facts to substantiate the assumptions of the agent and held
39. Id. at 583-84. The IRS used the illegally seized evidence of three
days wagering to estimate that Pizzarello received a total amount of

$2.824,407 from wagers over five years. The IRS assessed Pizzarello for
$282,440.70 which was 10% of the projected wagers allegedly made during the five year period and hence the amount of tax owed by Pizzarello.
40. Id. at 586.
41. 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 242-44.
43. Id. at 245.
44. Id. at 244-45.
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that the arbitrarily computed jeopardy assessment was "altogether fictitious. '45 The court strongly criticized the IRS for
abusing its broad discretionary power to seize a taxpayer's
46
property without notice.
The District of Columbia Circuit has also followed this growing trend of enjoining jeopardy assessments when there is a
questionable finding of jeopardy or improper computation of the
assessment. In Shapiro v. Secretary of State,47 the dismissal of
a suit to enjoin a jeopardy assessment was reversed and remanded to allow the complainant an opportunity to show that
the Government's calculation of the deficiency had no rational
basis. One day before the taxpayer's extradition to Israel to face
charges for securities fraud, the IRS imposed a jeopardy assessment on his bank accounts. The IRS claimed that the complainant owed back taxes for income derived from activities as a
dealer in narcotics. 48 The court reversed the dismissal of the
taxpayer's suit for injunction because the record did not contain
any facts which would support the Commissioner's discretionary
finding of jeopardy. On remand the District Court was directed
to dismiss the suit unless the IRS produced some evidence to
49
substantiate the jeopardy assessment.
The Third Circuit has also registered disapproval of the
present misuse of jeopardy procedures. In Sherman v. Nash,50
that court reversed a dismissal of the taxpayer's suit for an injunction against a jeopardy assessment. The plaintiff had alleged that the assessment had been imposed solely to assist the
45. Id. at 245.
46. Id. at 246. Shortly after Willits was decided, the Fifth Circuit re-

versed another dismissal of a suit to enjoin a termination assessment. In

Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974), plaintiff's employees were stopped while driving a truck through Laredo, Texas. Upon
examination of the truck, the arresting officers discovered $11,270 in a
sack in the driver's compartment. The IRS was notified of the incident
and a termination assessment for $12,774 resulted in a levy on the plaintiff's $11,270 and his truck, which was sold for $750. Since plaintiff was
a Mexican citizen, who was not shown to have earned income taxable
by the United States, the court felt that he should be entitled to question
the validity of the termination assessment. The court was also concerned
that the plaintiff's
money and truck [were] taken peremptorily from him at the instance of drug law enforcers with no more than a vague suggestion
that the Government 'suspected' that these strangers were trafficking
in drugs. Adding to the mystery of the basis for the 'suspicion' is
the total-the word is total-lack of any basis for computing the quick
terminated tax to be $12,774.00-almost the precise total of the money
and the value of the truck-a pattern followed often in the contemporary practice where tax mechanisms are employed 'not as tax collection devices but as summary punishment to supplement or complement regular criminal procedures.'
Id. at 130-31.
47. 499 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. Id. at 529-30.
49. Id. at 533, 535.
50. 488 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Justice Department in an attempt to force him to appear before
a grand jury investigating criminal activities in New Jersey. 5 1
The Third Circuit found that these allegations would be a sufficient basis for enjoining the jeopardy assessment. The court
reasoned that the section 7421(a) bar against injunctions of tax
assessments would not protect the IRS when a jeopardy assessment was used solely "as a device to harass a taxpayer or as
a leverage to exert pressure on a taxpayer for nontax purposes."'5 2 The Third Circuit also felt that the IRS should not
have "complete license to act arbitrarily and in bad faith and
'53
for other than the purpose of preserving revenue.
So far four circuits have taken the position that a jeopardy
assessment can be enjoined if the IRS abused its discretion in
making a finding of jeopardy or computing the actual tax assessment.54 This is a radical change from earlier treatment of the
jeopardy problem under which courts did not recognize that they
had authority to review the determination of jeopardy by the
Commissioner." 5
51. Id. at 1083.
52. Id. at 1084.

53. Id.

54. See also Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973). The
tax assessment against Lucia was based on a revenue agent's calculation
of wagers accepted by Lucia from March 1957 until November 1963. The
agent based his calculations on one day's betting slips which were seized
on a raid of Lucia's alleged gambling operation during the 1962 football
season. The agent was able to estimate from the receipts that Lucia accepted $28,780 in bets on the day of the raid. Assuming that wagers were
accepted six days per week and that the seized receipts represented an
average day, the agent determined that Lucia accepted a total of
$2,244.840 during the 13-week football season. The agent further assumed that football season wagers constituted 40% of Lucia's yearly total, and that therefore Lucia accepted annual gross wagers of $5,612,100.
Lucia contended that this method of computation was without factual
foundation. The Second Circuit held that the jeopardy assessment would
be enjoined if Lucia could prove his allegations about the arbitrary computation of the assessment. In Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), the Federal Narcotics Bureau seized $247,500 from the
plaintiff and turned it over to the IRS which imposed a jeopardy assessment for $247,820 on the plaintiff. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
in his refund action after the court found that the determination of jeopardy "can only be described as arbitrary, capricious, and unconscionable." The court reached this conclusion after hearing testimony by the
IRS agent who prepared the assessment that there were no facts to support the determination of deficiency. The only basis for the jeopardy
assessment was that unnamed agents of the Bureau of Narcotics believed
that the seized funds represented proceeds from the sale of narcotics in
the United States. In United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F. Supp. 750
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) aff'd, 428 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970), the court denied a motion to dismiss a suit by the taxpayer
to enjoin a jeopardy assessment. The court found that the IRS had used
the jeopardy assessment for other purposes than protecting revenue. In
White v. Cardoza, 368 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Mich. 1973), a motion to dismiss a suit to enjoin a jeopardy assessment was denied to allow plaintiff
an opportunity to show that the assessment was based on inaccurate records and that the Government had no proof that plaintiff derived income
from wagering, even though gambling income had been the alleged basis
for the assessment.
55. Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1957); Veeder v.
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THE REQUIREMENT OF A DEFICIENCY NOTICE IN
TERMINATION ASSESSMENT CASES

Closely related to the problem of enjoining jeopardy assessments by questioning the finding of jeopardy or calculation of
the assessment is the problem of termination of a taxpayer's
taxable year under section 6851.56 Once his taxable year has
been terminated, a taxpayer's assets may be seized and there is
some dispute among the courts as to whether the IRS is required
to send a deficiency notice. Without a deficiency notice, the taxpayer cannot secure a prompt review of his liability in Tax
Court. He must either pay the tax and sue for a refund in district court or wait until the end of his normal taxable year and
then contest the assessment in Tax Court.57 The issue raised in
a number of recent cases is whether a taxpayer who has been
subjected to a section 6851 termination assessment is entitled
to the same procedural safeguards that are available under a
section 6861 jeopardy assessment. Essentially this problem is
a question of whether the IRS is required to send a deficiency
notice within 60 days after the termination assessment, as it
is required to do under section 6861.58 If a deficiency notice
is required, but the IRS fails to mail such a notice to the taxpayer, the termination assessment can be enjoined under section 6213 (a) .59 Since the IRS has made frequent use of the termination assessment in conjunction with narcotics enforcement
activities, there are many new decisions on the issue of whether
a deficiency notice is required. Although cases have gone both
ways, the current trend is that such a notice must be sent to
the taxpayer.8 0
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929); LaLonde v. United States, 350
F. Supp. 976 (D. Minn. 1972); Adler v. Nicholas, 70 F. Supp. 514 (D.C.
Col. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1948); Foundation Co. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1936).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 6851 (a) (1) (1970) cited in note 8 supra.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970) cited
in note 10 supra.
58. The three other safeguards afforded to a taxpayer who has been
subjected to a section 6861 jeopardy assessment are: (1) the jeopardy
taxpayer can stay collection of the assessment by filing bond under section 6863(a), see note 19 and accompanying text supra, (2) property
seized pursuant to a jeopardy assessment generally cannot be sold while
litigation is pending in the Tax Court (26 U.S.C. § 6863(b) (3) (A)), and
(3) the IRS has authority to abate a jeopardy assessment if it finds that
jeopardy does not exist. 26 U.S.C. § 6861 (g) (1970). Clark v. Campbell,
501 F.2d 108. 114 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Schreck v. United States, 301
F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D.C. Md. 1969).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (1970) cited in note 12 supra.
60. Cases holding that a deficiency notice is not required: Lewis v.
Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974) (follows reasoning in Irving v.
Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973)); Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1974) (no injunction for failure of IRS to send a deficiency notice after a termination assessment following same reasoning as in Irving
v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973)); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.
1973) (deficiency notice not required for a termination assessment be-
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Tax Court jurisdiction to redetermine liability prior to payment is predicated on the existence of a deficiency as defined
in section 6211. The Government argues that the liability which
arises when a person's taxable year is terminated under section
6851 does not constitute a "deficiency." 6' 1 The Government finds
support for its position in section 6211 and the applicable regulation, section 301.6211-1, which define "deficiency" in terms of the
taxpayer's liability at the close of a normal taxable period. 62 The
Government argues that the tax liability that arises upon a
termination assessment is not a deficiency because there can be
no deficiency until tax liability is ascertainable, and the tax liability cannot be determined until the end of the regular taxable
period. The Government suggests that what really is being
cause the assessment is not a deficiency as defined in section 6211 and
because the taxpayer has an adequate remedy with a refund suit in district court once the assessment is paid); Preble v. United States, 376 F.
Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1974) (deficiency notice not required for a termination assessment because the tax liability which arises upon a section
6851 assessment is not a deficiency as specifically defined under section
6211(a)); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735, 736 (S.D. Ind. 1972) (deficiency notice not required because the amount of tax determined for a
terminated taxable period "is only a provisional statement of the amount
that must be presently paid as a protection against the impossibility of
collection at some future date"); Williamson v. United States, 31 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971) (deficiency notice not required in the
case of a termination assessment because such an assessment is not an
imposed tax and merely justifies termination of the taxable year).
Cases holding that a deficiency notice is required: Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974) (termination assessment, which was imposed after seizure of the taxpayer's assets by narcotics agents, enjoined
because the current Tax Court position and the legislative history of section 6851 require that a deficiency notice be sent in the case of termination assessments); Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974)
(injunction issued based on the reasoning in Rambo v. United States, 492
F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974), after the IRS imposed a termination assessment
charging that taxpayer's involvement in illicit narcotics activities rendered prior collection of taxpayer's income tax ineffectual); Rambo v.
United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974) (injunction of termination
assessment, which had been imposed after Rambo was arrested for reckless driving and a search of his car revealed a supply of drugs); Williams
v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D.C. Nev. 1973); Lisner v. McCanless,
356 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Ariz. 1973) (termination assessment for narcotics
violations enjoined because general tax statute scheme shows Congressional intent that termination assessments are subject to the normal assessment rules under which a deficiency notice is required); Schreck v.
United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D.C. Md. 1969).
61. Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 116 (5th Cir. 1974); Irving v.
Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1973); Schreck v. United States, 301
F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D.C.Md. 1969).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 6211(a) (1970) cited in note 7 supra. Regulation
301.6211-1 states that:
If no return is made, or if the return (except a return of income tax
pursuant to sec. 6014) does not show any tax, for the purpose of the
definition "the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his
return" shall be considered zero. Accordingly, in any such case, if
no deficiencies with respect to the tax have been assessed, or collected without assessment, and no rebates with respect to the tax
have been made, the deficiency is the amount of the tax imposed by
subtitle A, chapter 11 ....
26 C.F.R. § 301.6211-1 (1975).
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assessed in the section 6851 situation is the possibility of an
63
eventual tax liability or deficiency.
Despite the Government's contentions, the Tax Court has
recently held that a section 6851 termination assessment brings
the taxable period to a close and creates a liability such as would
exist at the close of the normal taxable period.6 4 This interpretation is strong support for the conclusion that the tax liability
created by a section 6851 termination is within the Code's definition of deficiency.
Prior to the Tax Court's decision, the Maryland District
Court had decided in Schreck v. United States6" that the legislative history of section 6851 supported the conclusion that tax
liability under that section was a deficiency. The Schreck court
began its treatment of the legislative history with a discussion
of section 250(g) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1918,66 which
was the forerunner of section 6851. Under the early tax laws,
assessment authority for both normal and jeopardy taxes was
given in section 1317. All taxpayers were required to settle any
disputes over tax liability by paying the disputed tax and then
bringing an action for refund. 67 The inherent unfairness of this
"pay and sue" rule resulted in the establishment of the Board
of Tax Appeals (later called the Tax Court) in 1924.68 The Board
63. Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 118 (5th Cir. 1974); Schreck v.
United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1274 (D.C. Md. 1969).
64. Sanzogno v. C.I.R., 60 T.C. 321 (1973). In Sanzogno, the IRS terminated the taxable year of an Italian citizen who had received $8,000
in the United' States as an orchestra conductor. Sanzogno was required
to obtain a sailing permit pursuant to section 6851 (d) by filing a Departing Alien Income Tax Return. Three years after Sanzogno had filed the
return and returned to Italy, the IRS mailed him a deficiency notice with
respect to the income he had received as a conductor in the United States.
Sanzogno contended that he had filed a return and that the three year
statute of limitations had expired. The IRS maintained that the departing alien return was not a "final return" for that year and that Sanzogno
should have filed a regular income tax return at the close of his normal
taxable year before the statute of limitations would begun to run. The
Tax Court rejected the argument of the IRS and held that the departing
alien return covered Sanzogno's entire taxable year which had been terminated at the time of his departure. The tax liability which arises at
the close of a terminated taxable year is the same as at the close of a
normal taxable year.
65. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D.C. Md. 1969).
66. Revenue Act of 1918, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1057.
67. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (D.C. Md.
1969).
68. The House Report summarizes the reasons which prompted Congress to establish the Board of Tax appeals:
The right of 'appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assessment. The payment of a large additional tax on income
received several years Previous and which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped out by subsequent losses, invested in nonliquid assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into bankruptcy,
and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the tax after this payment. He is entitled to an appeal
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of Tax Appeals and related deficiency notice procedure provided
a forum for resolution of tax disputes without requiring the
taxpayer to pre-pay a contested tax. Under the 1926 Revenue
Act,69 even- the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer was allowed access
to the Tax Court under a statutory requirement that a deficiency
notice be sent within 60 days after the assessment. The Schreck
court interpreted these developments as a movement away from
the unjust effects of early tax law which required a taxpayer
to pay any disputed taxes before there would be a hearing on
the amount properly due. Even the jeopardy taxpayer was
afforded certain safeguards such as a prohibition on sale of his
seized property prior to a final determination of his tax liability
by the Tax Court. It was inconceivable to the Schreck court
that Congress did not intend to give similar protection to a taxpayer whose taxable year had been terminated under section
6851. For this reason, Schreck held that the procedural safeguards of section 6861, including the sending of a deficiency
notice within 60 days after the assessment, applied to termination
70
assessments.
Although the decision of the Schreck court is based on a
sound analysis of the legislative history of jeopardy assessments,
another district court has provided a simple and unique approach
to the issue of whether a deficiency notice is required in the case
of a termination assessment. In Williams v. United States,71 the
Las Vegas Police Department notified the IRS when they
arrested the plaintiff for selling heroin. The IRS imposed a
termination assessment on the plaintiff after it had been estimated that the plaintiff was making daily sales of $900 worth
of narcotics. 72 In its decision, the Nevada District Court was not
willing to adopt the legislative history argument of Schreck because the language of section 6851 was sufficiently ambiguous
to support the IRS view that a deficiency notice is not required
for a termination assessment. 73 The Williams court, however,
enjoined the assessment simply because requiring the IRS to send
a deficiency notice in termination assessment cases would not en74
danger the Government's right to ensure collection of revenues.
The court held that the section 6861 requirement that a deficiency notice be sent within 60 days applied to termination assessand to determination of his liability for the tax prior to its payment.

H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., (1924).

69. Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9.
70. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1273-74 (D.C. Md.
1969).
71. 373 F. Supp. 71 (D.C. Nev. 1973).

72. Id. at 72-73.
73. Id. at 76.
74. Id. at 78, 80-81.
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ment cases. 75 The Williams decision and a number of other cases
show that courts are willing to recognize that the taxpayer has
a right to some kind of hearing on his tax liability soon after
a termination assessment.7 6
CONCLUSION

The fact that a growing number of courts require that a
deficiency notice be sent to a taxpayer whose taxable year has
been terminated may encourage Congress to enact a statutory
provision to the same effect. Both the legislative history of section 6851 and the current Tax Court position support such a solution to the jeopardy termination problem.
Similarly, congressional action is needed to prevent the
current abuse of the discretionary power to declare jeopardy
under sections 6851 and 6861. In 1953 Congress recognized that
in some instances arbitrary jeopardy assessments were greatly
in excess of the tax eventually found due. 77 Congress then
enacted the abatement provision, section 6861(g), 7s to provide
relief for the taxpayer when the assets seized greatly exceeded
the projected tax liability. The abatement provision gave the
IRS authority to abate a jeopardy assessment if it determined
that jeopardy no longer existed. Unfortunately, the abatement
provision has not been an effective safeguard against misuse of
jeopardy by the IRS.
Although jeopardy assessments can be applied to tax problems which arise in connection with narcotics dealers, the use
75. Id. at 81.
76. Cases cited in note 60 supra.
77. S. REP. No. 730, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2398-99 (1953):
H.R. 6402 specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
abate so-called jeopardy assessments when the Secretary determines
that jeopardy does not exist.
Under existing law if the Bureau of Internal Revenue believes that
ultimate collection of a tax is in danger, it may make a so-called
jeopardy assessment. This is an arbitrary assessment designed to
get control of available assets of the taxpayer pending final determination of the liability, if any. At the present time, once such an
assessment has been made, the Bureau believes that it does not have
authority to revoke the assessment even though it finds that a mistake has been made and that there is no danger of losing the tax.
As a result, the Bureau has had in the past and now has cases before
it in which arbitrary jeopardy assessments, which may be greatly in
excess of any tax finally found to be due, are a cause of financial
embarrassment and danger to the taxpayer involved. The Bureau
believes it is unable to do anything about such cases even though
it agrees that there would be no risk to the revenue in following normal procedures.
This bill simply permits the revocation of a jeopardy assessment
whenever it appears that there is in fact no danger of losing any tax
which may be due.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 6861(g) (1970):
The Secretary or his delegate may abate the jeopardy assessment if
he finds that jeopardy does not exist.
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of jeopardy assessments as a means of drug enforcement has
provided some of the most flagrant examples of how the broad
jeopardy powers have been used for purposes other than to protect revenues. In order to prevent further abuse of the discretionary power to declare jeopardy, new statutory action is
required.
One possible solution would be to apply the current search
warrant procedures to jeopardy assessments. The IRS would be
required to make a showing of probable cause before a neutral
detached magistrate or district court judge that a jeopardy situation exists. The judge or magistrate would have sole power to
determine whether a jeopardy assessment would actually be imposed. If circumstances made it impossible to secure prior
judicial approval of a jeopardy assessment, the IRS would still
be allowed to make such an assessment and immediate levy, subject to prompt judicial review of the reasons for the IRS findings
of jeopardy. By adapting search warrant procedures to jeopardy
assessments a dual purpose could be served. Not only would
the Government's interest in prompt collection of taxes be protected, but also there would be some accommodation to the
general due process requirement that there can be no seizure
without prior notice. Unless Congress takes some action soon,
the taxpayers will be forced to wait for the lengthy process of
judicial legislation to develop completely what is now only a
growing trend.
John H. Anderson

